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 Executive Summary 
 
 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are the two dominant entities in the secondary residential 
mortgage markets of the U.S.  They are an important and prominent part of a larger mosaic of 
extensive efforts by governments at all levels to encourage the production and consumption of 
housing. 
 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are a unique part of this effort.  Though they appear to be 
"normal" corporations, each with shares that trade on the New York Stock Exchange, they in fact 
have federal government origins and entanglements that make them quite special.  Indeed, a 
common description of them is that they are "government sponsored enterprises" (GSEs).  Their 
specialness is a two-edged sword:  On one side, they do cause interest rates on many residential 
mortgages to be lower than would otherwise be the case; on the other, their size and mode of 
operation have created a significant contingent liability for the federal government and ultimately 
for taxpayers.  In addition, the size and prominence of the two GSEs has recently led to concerns 
about systemic risks: about the larger consequences for the U.S. economy if either were to 
experience financial difficulties. 
 
 There is good economic theory, and a mounting body of evidence to support the theory, that 
points to the idea that home ownership has positive spillover ("externality") effects for society and 
thus that targeted policies to encourage home ownership (by those who would otherwise rent) can 
improve a society's allocation of economic resources.  However, the broad policies that encourage 
home ownership do not address those spillover effects in a focused way (and policies that 
encourage more rental housing, of course, are contrary to the goal of encouraging home ownership). 
 Instead, they simply encourage the consumption of more housing -- at the expense of other things -
- by those who would have bought anyway, with the consequence that our society's resources are 
less efficiently allocated rather than more efficiently allocated.  The encouragement that is provided 
through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is largely of this broad-based nature and thus suffers from 
this same distortionary consequence. 
 
 My conclusion is that the special governmental links that apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac yield little that is socially beneficial, while creating potential social costs.  Consequently, the 
appropriate "first-best" policy would be to privatize them completely -- i.e., to sever all 
governmental links and convert them to truly "normal" corporations -- as well as to pursue other 
measures that would better address the positive externality of home ownership and efficiently 
reduce the cost of housing.  In the event that this true privatization does not occur, suitable "second-
best" policies -- stronger statements by Treasury officials that the federal government has no 
intention of supporting the two companies, improved safety-and-soundness regulation of the two 
companies, the application of limits on the amounts of their debt that can be held by regulated 
depository institutions, and increased efforts to focus the GSEs on the segment of the housing 
market where their social benefits would be greatest -- are advocated as well. 
 I. Introduction 
 
 The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are the two dominant entities in the secondary residential 
mortgage markets of the U.S.  They are an important and prominent part of a larger mosaic of 
extensive efforts by governments at all levels to encourage the production and consumption of 
housing. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are a unique part of this effort, however:  Though they appear 
to be "normal" corporations, each with shares that trade on the New York Stock Exchange, they in 
fact have federal government origins and entanglements that make them quite special.  Indeed, a 
common description of them is that they are "government sponsored enterprises" (GSEs).  Their 
specialness is a two-edged sword:  On one side, they do cause interest rates on many residential 
mortgages to be lower than would otherwise be the case; on the other, their size and mode of 
operation have created a significant contingent liability for the federal government and ultimately 
for taxpayers.  In addition, the size and prominence of the two GSEs has recently led to concerns 
about systemic risks: about the larger consequences for the U.S. economy if either were to 
experience financial difficulties. 
 There is good economic theory, and a mounting body of evidence to support the theory, that 
points to the idea that home ownership has positive spillover ("externality") effects for society and 
thus that targeted policies to encourage home ownership (by those who would otherwise rent) can 
improve a society's allocation of economic resources.  However, the broad policies that encourage 
home ownership do not address those spillover effects in a focused way (and policies that 
encourage more rental housing, of course, are contrary to the goal of encouraging home ownership). 
 Instead, they simply encourage the consumption of more housing -- at the expense of other things -
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- by those who would have bought anyway, with the consequence that our society's resources are 
less efficiently allocated rather than more efficiently allocated.  The encouragement that is provided 
through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is largely of this broad-based nature and thus suffers from 
this same distortionary consequence. 
 This paper will expand upon these themes.1  My conclusion is that the special governmental 
links that apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac yield little that is socially beneficial, while creating 
potential social costs.  Consequently, the appropriate "first-best" policy would be to privatize them 
completely -- i.e., to sever all governmental links and convert them to truly "normal" corporations -- 
as well as to pursue other measures that would better address the positive externality of home 
ownership and efficiently reduce the cost of housing.  In the event that this true privatization does 
not occur, suitable "second-best" policies are advocated as well. 
 
 
 II. Some Background 
 
A. What they do. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each operate two related lines of business:  They issue and 
guarantee mortgage-backed securities, and they invest in mortgage assets.  Both businesses warrant 
further explanation. 
 1. Issue and guarantee mortgage-backed securities.  A typical transaction in today's 
mortgage markets involves a swap of a pool (bundle) of residential mortgages that have been 
originated by a commercial bank, a savings and loan (S&L) association, or a mortgage bank2 for a 
set of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that have been issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and 
that represent a claim on the interest and principal payments on the same mortgage pool.  The two 
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companies guarantee timely payment of principal and interest to the MBS holders and, for this 
guarantee, charge about 20 basis points (0.20 percentage points) annually on the outstanding 
principal amounts.  The originators, in turn, have a liquid security that they can hold on their 
balance sheets (with a substantial regulatory advantage for commercial banks and S&Ls over 
holding the underlying mortgages themselves) or sell in secondary markets (which mortgage banks 
immediately do).  As can be seen in Table 1, as of year-end 2003 the two GSEs together had over 
$2 trillion in outstanding MBS. 
 2. Invest in mortgage-related assets.  Instead of swapping MBS for mortgages, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac may buy the mortgages outright and hold them in their portfolios (or sometimes 
securitize them and sell the MBS to the public).  The two companies also repurchase their MBS 
through transactions in the secondary market, and most of their mortgage-related assets are now 
repurchased MBS.  As can be seen in Table 1, the two companies' mortgage-related assets at year-
end 2003 totaled almost $1.8 trillion.  The two companies fund their mortgage-related asset 
holdings overwhelmingly through the issuance of debt. 
 
B. Some history. 
 Fannie Mae was created in 1938, under the authority of the National Housing Act of 1934.  
Until 1968, it was a unit within the federal government.  Its function was to expand the availability 
of residential mortgage finance, by buying mortgages from originators and holding the mortgages; 
these purchases were funded through debt issuances that were direct obligations of the federal 
government. 
 As part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Fannie Mae was spun off 
from the federal government and became a publicly traded corporation, but it retained an array of 
special government features (which will be discussed below).3  Its function continued to be that of 
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expanding the availability of residential mortgage finance through mortgage purchases, largely from 
mortgage banks, that were funded overwhelmingly by debt.  Also, Fannie Mae was replaced within 
the federal government in 1968 by the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), 
an entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs (HUD) that guarantees MBS that 
represent claims on pools of mortgages that are insured by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) or 
the Veterans Administration (VA). 
 Freddie Mac was created in 1970 also to expand the availability of residential mortgage 
finance, primarily through the securitization of mortgages purchased from S&Ls.  Though the first 
MBS were issued by Ginnie Mae in 1970, Freddie Mac was a fast second with its initial MBS 
issuance in 1971.  Through the 1970s and 1980s, Freddie Mac was owned solely by the twelve 
banks of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and by the S&Ls that were members of the 
FHLB system.  Freddie Mac became a publicly traded company in 1989, but with the same ties to 
the federal government as is true for Fannie Mae.4 
 Through the 1970s and 1980s the business strategies of the two GSEs were somewhat 
divergent, as can be seen in Table 1.  Fannie Mae tended to focus on mortgage purchases for its 
own portfolio (it issued its first MBS only in 1981), while Freddie Mac tended to focus on MBS 
issuances.  Since 1990, however, the two companies' business strategies have been largely similar: 
rapid growth of both their portfolio businesses and their MBS businesses.  Indeed, their growth 
rates since 1990 -- especially for Freddie Mac -- have been breathtaking.  As Table 1 also indicates, 
their growth rates have been far faster than that of the overall mortgage markets.  As of 1980, the 
two companies' mortgage holdings plus MBS accounted for only 7% of the total of all residential 
mortgages.  By 2003 their aggregate involvement in the mortgage market came to 47%. 
 More detailed data on the two companies' shares of various slices of the mortgage markets 
are available for 2000:5 
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 - 39% of the $5.6 trillion total6 of all residential mortgages; 
 - 40% of the $5.2 trillion total of all single-family (one-to-four units) mortgages (excluding 
multi-family); 
 - 48% of the $4.4 trillion total of all single-family conventional mortgages (which excludes 
FHA- and VA-insured mortgages); 
 - 60% of the $3.5 trillion total of all single-family conforming mortgages (which also 
excludes jumbo mortgages); 
 - 71% of the $2.8 trillion total of all fixed-rate single-family conforming mortgages (which 
also excludes adjustable-rate mortgages). 
 
C. Current sizes. 
 As is indicated in Table 1, as of year-end 2003, Fannie Mae had $1,010 billion in assets and 
Freddie Mac had $803 billion in assets, making them the second- and third-largest companies in the 
U.S. when ranked by assets.  In addition, Fannie Mae had $1,300 billion in outstanding MBS (i.e., 
net of the MBS that it had repurchased and was holding in its asset portfolio), and Freddie Mac had 
$769 billion in outstanding MBS.  They are the largest and second-largest issuers (and guarantors) 
of MBS in the U.S. 
 
 
 III. The Special Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Consequences 
 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not ordinary corporations.  They differ from all other 
corporations in the U.S. in a large number of ways.  These differences are best illustrated by listing 
them under the categories of advantages and disadvantages. 
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 A. Advantages 
 - They were created by Congress and thus hold special federal charters (unlike virtually all 
other corporations, which hold charters granted by a state, often Delaware); 
 - The President can appoint five of the eighteen board members of each company;7 
 - Each company has a potential line of credit with the U.S. Treasury for up to $2.25 billion; 
 - Both companies are exempt from state and local income taxes; 
 - They can use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent;8  
 - Their debt is eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for purchase by the Federal 
Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by commercial banks and S&Ls; 
 - Their securities are exempt from the Securities and Exchange Commission's registration 
and reporting requirements and fees;9 
 - Their securities are explicitly government securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934; and 
 - Their securities are exempt from the provisions of many state investor protection laws. 
 This "package" of special benefits directly lowers their costs and has also created a "halo" of 
implied federal government protection for the two enterprises.  This halo has been reinforced by the 
past government forbearance when Fannie Mae was insolvent on a market-value basis in the late 
1970s and early 1980s and by a taxpayer bailout of the Farm Credit System (which had similar 
benefits) in the late 1980s.10  They are frequently described as "government sponsored enterprises" 
(GSEs).11  Perhaps most importantly, because the financial markets believe that the special GSE 
status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac implies that the federal government would come to their 
(and their creditors') rescue in the event of financial difficulties -- despite specific language on every 
security that they issue that declares that the securities are not guaranteed by or otherwise an 
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obligation of the federal government -- their debt is treated favorably by the financial markets:12  
They can borrow on more favorable terms (i.e., at lower interest rates) than their credit ratings as 
stand-alone enterprises would otherwise justify.  Typically, they can borrow at rates that are more 
favorable than those of a AAA-rated corporation (though not quite as favorably as the rates on the 
debt of the U.S. Government itself), even though their stand-alone ratings would be about AA-
minus or less; this translates into about a 35-40 basis point advantage.13  Similarly, they enjoy about 
a 30 basis-point advantage in issuing their MBS as a consequence of their special GSE status.14 
 
B. Disadvantages 
 - Their special charters restrict them to residential mortgage finance. 
 - They are specifically forbidden to engage in mortgage origination. 
 - They are subject to a maximum size of mortgage (linked to an annual index of housing 
prices) that they can finance;15 for 2004 that limit for a single-family home is $333,700.16 
 - The mortgages that they finance must have at least a 20% down payment (i.e., a maximum 
loan-to-value ratio of 80%) or a credit enhancement (such as mortgage insurance). 
 - They are subject to safety-and-soundness regulation -- e.g., minimum capital requirements 
and annual examinations -- by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).17 
 - They are subject to "mission oversight" by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), which approves specific housing finance programs and sets social housing 
targets for the two companies. 
  
C. The Effects on Residential Mortgages 
 The presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the secondary mortgage market influences 
rates in the primary mortgage market.  Their activities cause the rates on the "conforming" 
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mortgages that they can buy to be about 20-25 basis points lower than the rates on "jumbo" 
mortgages.18  In addition, their presence may well bring greater stability to the mortgage markets,19 
and historically they were able to bring greater uniformity and unification to what otherwise would 
have been localized and disconnected markets, since regulatory restrictions on interstate banking 
and even intra-state bank branching in some states persisted for most of the twentieth century and 
prevented banks and S&Ls from bringing this unification.  Also, the two companies may have been 
focal points for market-wide standard setting with respect to the technological advances in the 
processes of mortgage origination.20  And, historically, they were important in the development of 
MBS and of mortgage securitization generally as an alternative efficient mechanism for residential 
mortgage finance. 
 
 
 IV. The Policy Issues 
 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not, of course, exist in a vacuum.  There are at least six 
larger issues that surround them and that deserve greater exploration, so as to evaluate the special 
position and role of the two companies.  Those larger issues are: (a) the widespread public policies 
in the U.S. that encourage the construction and consumption of housing; (b) the safety-and-
soundness regulation of financial institutions where there are concerns about the social 
consequences of the insolvency of those institutions; (c) the possible systemic consequences of their 
size and behavior; (d) the question who should bear the interest-rate risks that are concomitant with 
the long-term debt instrument that is the modern mortgage in the U.S.; (e) the question of the 
efficient transmission to homebuyers of the benefits bestowed on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a 
consequence of their special GSE status; and (f) the question of possible inherent efficiencies or 
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inefficiencies of the two companies' activities.  We will address each in turn. 
 
A. Housing 
 U.S. public policy, at all levels of government, embraces extensive policies to encourage the 
construction and consumption of housing.  These policies (some are largely historical; many still 
apply) include: 
 - Tax advantages: the exclusion of the implicit income from housing by owner-occupiers for 
income tax purposes, while allowing the deduction of mortgage interest and local real estate taxes; 
the exemption of owner-occupied housing from capital gains taxation; accelerated depreciation on 
rental housing; special tax credits, exemptions, and deductions; 
 - Rent subsidization programs; 
 - Direct government provision of rental housing ("public housing"); 
 - Mortgage insurance provided by FHA and VA; 
 - Securitization of FHA and VA mortgages by Ginnie Mae; 
 - Securitization of conforming mortgages by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; 
 - Purchases of mortgages for portfolio holdings by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; 
 - Separate depository charters for savings institutions (thrifts) with mandates to invest in 
residential mortgages; 
 - Favorable funding for thrifts and other depository institutions that focus on mortgage 
lending through the FHLB system; and 
 - Federal deposit insurance for thrifts and for other depositories whose portfolios contain 
some residential mortgages. 
 It may be only a modest exaggeration to describe government policy toward housing as one 
where, "Too much is never enough!" 
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 The motives underlying public policy actions frequently are varied and diverse, and the 
housing policies just enumerated are no exception.  In-kind redistributions of income toward lower-
income households are one component (though that motive cannot justify the various income tax 
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions, which primarily benefit higher-income households).  The 
beneficial effects for revenues and employment in the residential construction industry and its 
complementary industry allies are another.  The encouragement of home ownership is a third (at 
least for those policies that are not focused on encouraging the provision of rental housing). 
 There is a reasonable theoretical basis for the existence of positive externalities that would 
support government policies to encourage home ownership.  A standard set of contracting and 
asymmetric information problems exist between landlord and tenant, which are internalized when 
the tenant becomes an owner-occupier.  Though many of the gains from the solving of those 
problems accrue to the parties themselves, there may well be positive externalities for the 
neighbors:  To the extent that an owner-occupier takes better care of her residence (especially the 
exterior) than does the landlord-tenant combination, the neighbors surely benefit as well.  Further, 
to the extent that the owner-occupier cares more about the neighborhood (because of the positive 
externalities for herself and her property values) and has a longer-run perspective than does the 
tenant (or the landlord, who may not live in the neighborhood and is unlikely to be as involved), 
again there will be positive externalities from home ownership.  Finally, even if the household itself 
is a major beneficiary from the conversion to home ownership, the community may still benefit 
from the household's improved status (e.g., the household may become more socially minded 
because of its improved status), again implying externalities.21 
 There is now a modest but growing empirical literature that provides some documentation 
for the existence of these positive externalities for neighborhoods and positive effects on owner-
occupier families themselves.22 
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 The logical linkage to policy from this externality would be to have tightly focused 
programs that would encourage low- and moderate-income households, who may be on the margin 
between renting and owning, to become first-time home buyers.  Such programs could provide 
explicit subsidies for reducing down payments23 and reducing monthly payments.24 
 Tightly focused programs are not the norm in housing, however.  Far more common are 
broad-based programs that encourage more housing construction and consumption throughout the 
income and social spectrum.  For example, the income tax benefits from home ownership are 
broad-based and, because they largely operate as exemptions and deductions rather than as 
refundable tax credits, tend to favor higher-income households in higher marginal tax brackets.25 
 The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac structure is of this broad-based nature.  Though the two 
companies' mortgage purchases and swaps are subject to the ceiling of the conforming loan limit, 
that limit is substantially above the 80% mortgage on the median-priced home in the U.S.  For 
example, in 2002, the conforming loan limit for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was $300,700.  In 
that same year, the median price of a new home that was sold was $187,600; an 80% mortgage on 
that sale price would have been $150,080.  Also in that year the median price on the sale of an 
existing home was $158,100, and an 80% mortgage on that sale price would have been $126,400. 
 Thus, the conforming loan limits allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase residential 
mortgage loans that are far beyond the range that would encompass the low- or moderate-income 
first-time buying household.26  Though HUD does set goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with 
respect to "affordable housing,"27 which the two companies have met, the bulk of their mortgage 
purchases do not involve the group that ought to be the target of ownership-encouraging activities.28 
 Consistent with this, it appears that their activities have not appreciably affected the rate of home 
ownership in the U.S.29 
 Such broad-based programs mean that most beneficiaries would have bought anyway, and 
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the marginal effects are largely to cause them to buy larger and better-appointed homes, on larger 
lots, and/or to buy second homes (that are larger and better appointed).  But the positive 
externalities likely arise primarily from the ownership phenomenon itself and only modestly (if at 
all) from the size of the home (or from second homes). 
 In turn, this broad-based encouragement means that the U.S. has invested in an excessively 
and inefficiently large housing stock and that its stock of other physical (and perhaps human) 
capital is too small.  Edwin Mills has estimated that the U.S. housing stock is 30% larger than 
would be the case if these encouragements were absent and that U.S. income is about 10% lower 
than it could otherwise be.30  Patric Hendershott has estimated that, as of the mid 1980s, tax 
considerations alone encouraged a 10% larger housing stock.31  Martin Gervais has found that the 
taxation of the implicit rents on owner-occupied housing (accompanied by a compensating 
adjustment in tax rates) alone could cause general consumption levels to increase by almost 5%.32  
Lori Taylor has found that the over-investment in housing persisted over the period 1975-1995: "... 
the unmeasured benefit to housing would have to top $220 billion per year (or $300 per month for 
each owner-occupied home) to support the current allocation of resources."33 
 These results can be summarized bluntly:  The U.S. has too much housing (and not enough 
of other goods and services), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make it worse (while not doing an 
especially good job of focusing on the low- and moderate-income first-time buyer where the social 
argument is strongest). 
 
 B. Safety and Soundness 
 To the extent that the financial markets are correct in their belief about the implicit 
guarantee -- that the U.S. Government would come to the rescue of their creditors if either of the 
two companies experienced financial difficulties34 -- a moral hazard problem is created:  The 
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creditors do not monitor the two companies' managements as closely as they would if the creditors 
were more fearful of losses.35  In turn, the managements can engage in activities that involve greater 
riskiness, since the companies' owners will benefit from the "upside" outcomes while (because of 
the protections of limited liability) being buffered from the full consequences of large "downside" 
outcomes.  The creditors' guarantor -- the federal government -- is thus exposed to potential loss.36 
 This problem of moral hazard is a general problem for the creditors of a limited liability 
corporation.  Outside of the financial sector, creditors long ago realized the existence of the 
problem and created monitoring structures, as well as restrictions in lending agreements and 
covenants in bonds, that give creditors the ability to restrain owners' and managers' risk-taking, 
especially when net worth levels diminish.  For banks and other depositories, where the institution's 
primary creditors are considered to be less capable of monitoring and protecting themselves against 
this moral hazard behavior and where the consequences of bank insolvency failures have been 
considered economically serious (e.g., the potential problem of contagion) and politically serious 
(the losses experienced by individual depositors), federal and state safety-and-soundness regulation 
has been the public-sector substitute for the private monitoring just described.  The federal 
government's direct exposure to losses, because of federal deposit insurance (since 1933) provides 
another justification for such regulation. 
 With respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal government's exposure to 
potential losses from excessive risk-taking or even just from errors and poor judgments would 
logically call for safety-and-soundness regulation, akin to that applied to banks.37  Only in 1992, 
however, did the Congress come to that realization, in the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial 
Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA).  The FHEFSSA created OFHEO, lodged within HUD, as 
the safety-and-soundness regulator for the two companies and instructed the agency to develop 
forward-looking risk-based capital requirements for them.  Only ten years later did the agency 
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succeed in issuing a final set of those rules.  That delay, plus Fannie Mae's revelation of a large 
exposure to interest-rate risk in 2002 and Freddie Mac's revelation in 2003 of the necessity for a 
massive restatement of its recent years' income and balance sheet statements, have led to calls for 
strengthening the regulatory structure.  Among the proposals that have been actively considered 
are:38 
 - Moving the agency out of HUD (where the culture is more focused on housing) and into 
the Treasury (where the culture is more focused on safety and soundness); 
 - Reorganizing the agency as a freestanding ("independent") agency outside the executive 
branch, where it would be more independent of direct White House influence; 
 - Bringing the FHLB system (which is currently regulated by a separate -- also frequently 
criticized -- entity, the Federal Housing Finance Board) under the aegis of whatever agency is 
created; 
 - Strengthening the agency's ability to levy fees on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to fund 
itself, thus removing the agency from the vagaries of annual Congressional budgetary 
appropriations; 
 - Strengthening the agency's ability to set and revise the minimum capital requirements that 
the two companies must meet; 
 - Giving the agency a role in the setting of social targets for the two companies; and 
 - Giving the agency the power to appoint a receiver that could liquidate or otherwise dispose 
of either company's assets in the event that the company was unlikely to be able to attain its 
minimum capital requirements. 
 As of July 2004, no definitive legislative action had been taken. 
 
C. Systemic risk 
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 The general notion of systemic risk is that the financial problems of one institution could 
have wider-spread effects on other parts of the economy.  For commercial banks, a "contagion" 
effect is one such scenario, whereby depositor "runs" on one shaky bank might cause worried 
depositors of other banks to withdraw their cash from those banks, which would create a liquidity 
squeeze for those latter banks; or the liquidation of assets by the banks in their efforts to meet their 
depositors' claims could depress asset values sufficiently so that other banks' asset values and 
solvency were impaired.  Alternatively, there might be a "cascade" effect, whereby the chain of 
banks' claims on one another would mean that the insolvency of one bank would reduce the asset 
values of other banks that had claims on the first bank (and this cascade could lead to and reinforce 
a contagion problem, and vice-versa). 
 The discussion39 with respect to the possible systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac begins with the observations that they are very large (recall that they were the second- 
and third-largest companies in the U.S. at year-end 2003, when ranked by assets), they are highly 
leveraged (their net-worth-to-assets ratios are in the 3-4% range), they are focused on a narrow asset 
class, their MBS guarantees and investment portfolios together embody credit (default) risk on over 
$3.6 trillion of residential mortgage assets (or about 47% of the total market), and their investment 
portfolios alone embody potential interest-rate risk on $1.5 trillion in mortgage assets.  The 
discussion next splits into the question of whether they manage their risks sufficiently well (given 
their relatively thin capital levels) and then the question of what the larger consequences of 
financial difficulties for one or both companies might be. 
 The former set of questions are really just a more detailed analysis of the safety-and-
soundness issues discussed above.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac face two major categories of risk: 
credit risk (i.e., the risk that mortgage borrowers will default on their payment obligations and that 
the prices of the repossessed housing are below the outstanding loan balances, which would impair 
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the value of the mortgage assets in the companies' portfolios and/or require the companies to make 
payments on their MBS guarantees); and interest-rate risk (i.e., the risk that interest rates change 
after the investment in a mortgage, and the risk that changes in interest rates could cause the values 
of their mortgage portfolios to fall below the values of their outstanding debt obligations40). 
 With respect to credit risk, there is general agreement that the credit risk on most single-
family residential mortgages has been quite low.  The underwriting criteria used by lenders -- 
primarily adequate household income, and a good credit history -- is an important initial screen.  
Further, the home itself serves as the collateral for the mortgage in the event of default; most 
lenders require a 20% down payment (i.e., a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80%) or some form of 
mortgage insurance41 to provide a margin in the event of default; the borrower's monthly 
repayments diminish the unpaid balance, which leaves a greater margin to protect the lender; and 
home values have generally been rising in most areas of the U.S. for over 60 years (which again 
leaves a greater margin to protect the lender).  The credit-risk losses experienced by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac averaged 5.4 basis points annually over the 1987-2002 period, and the losses 
averaged only 1 basis point annually for 1999-2002.42  If there were to be a Great Depression type 
of collapse in housing values, however, these credit-risk losses could deteriorate considerably.43 
 Instead, the focus has been on interest-rate risk -- on the risk that interest rates may change, 
which would affect the market values of their mortgage assets and MBS.  This concern, of course, 
applies only to the assets held in the portfolios of the two companies, since the holders of their 
MBS are the bearers of the interest-rate risk on those MBS.  By holding large portfolios of largely 
long-term fixed-rate mortgages and MBS that can be prepayed without penalty, the two companies 
are thereby potentially exposed to extensive interest-rate risk.  In turn, they issue debt that is 
callable (so that, as mortgages prepay, the companies can call in the debt that has funded those 
mortgages), and they use derivative instruments, such as interest-rate swaps and options on swaps, 
 
 
 
to construct obligations that largely match the profile of their assets. 
 The two companies' defenders point to this debt structure and hedging as evidence that the 
companies are doing a good job of managing and dispersing their potential interest-rate risks.44  The 
GSEs' critics, however, argue that the absence of exact matching leaves open the possibilities of 
mistakes, which (given the two companies’ relatively low capital ratios) could snowball into a 
funding crisis for either or both companies.45  Further, they point to the large quantities of the 
companies' interest-rate swaps (the notional amount was about $1.6 trillion at year-end 2001), with 
five counterparties accounting for about 59% of their derivatives.  However, the transactions value 
of an interest-rate swap (the price of the option) is a small percentage of the notional value of the 
swap, and counterparties in derivatives trade are required to post collateral if their net exposure 
exceeds certain limits, with lower-rated counterparties' posting commensurately more collateral.  As 
of year-end 2001, the net uncollateralized exposures for Fannie Mae were only $110 million, and 
for Freddie Mac they were only $69 million.  In the event of a counterparty default, however, the 
two GSEs would be exposed to the "rollover risk" of finding new counterparties. 
 Regardless of which side has the better argument, these are really disputes that relate to 
safety-and-soundness of the two companies and should influence issues such as adequate levels of 
capital (net worth) for the two companies, given their asset and liability structures and activities and 
assurances as to counterparty creditworthiness.  The discussion of the systemic consequences of the 
two companies' sizes and actions are, however, linked to these disputes, since how strongly one 
feels about the systemic consequences (if any) of a financial problem by one or both companies is 
surely influenced by how likely one feels that such disruptive events could occur. 
 Any discussion of the systemic consequences must start with the sheer sizes of the two 
companies:  Their portfolio holdings and outstanding MBS now account for almost half of the total 
of all residential mortgages.  On the one hand, this size is a potential element for stability:  At times 
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of externally generated stress (e.g., the market stress of September 11, 2001; the potential market 
meltdown related to the demise of Long Term Capital Management in September 1998; or the stock 
market free-fall of October 1987), their continued participation in the secondary mortgage markets 
has been and can continue to be a source of strength and stability for those markets.  If either of 
them were to begin to falter financially, however, then their size becomes a systemic liability.  
Larger companies with greater volumes of activities and larger liabilities (and more widespread 
liability holders and counterparties) will necessarily have a greater effect when they falter.  If either 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were to experience financial difficulties, there would be potential 
effects on their existing liability holders as well as potential effects directly on mortgage markets.  
The systemic consequences of each path can be addressed as follows. 
 With respect to effects on existing liability holders, systemic effects (beyond just the direct 
losses experienced by the liability holders and counterparties) would depend on the extent of the 
direct losses and the extent to which the directly exposed parties are themselves leveraged (and thus 
their losses can impose further losses on others).  The extent of a GSE's losses in the event of 
financial difficulties are difficult to predict.  On the one hand, with respect to credit risks, the 
underlying assets are largely residential mortgages and ultimately the residential homes themselves. 
 The experience of the past 60 years is reassuring in this respect.  Home values have tended 
generally to rise; and even when they have fallen, they have not fallen to small fractions of their 
peaks (as can happen with the assets that underlie commercial loans).  Further, both companies are 
nationally diversified.   On the other hand, a reprise of the Great Depression could erase the 
relevance of this 60 years of experience.  And, with respect to interest-rate risk, the credit-risk 
experience is largely irrelevant, since the issue is how well the institution has hedged its interest-
rate exposure.  Overall, though the possibility of a GSE insolvency is surely not an impossibility -- 
this non-impossibility, after all, is an implication of the stand-alone AA- financial ratings of Fannie 
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Mae and Freddie Mac -- the extent of the insolvency (i.e., in terms of the percentage loss imposed 
on claims holders) is unlikely to be large.46 
 With respect to a contagion or cascading effect of creditor losses, the primary candidates 
would be depository institutions, which (in aggregate) hold about a sixth of the two companies' debt 
and about 40% of their MBS and which are allowed by regulation to hold unlimited amounts of 
their obligations.  A recent study47 shows that, as of the third quarter of 2003, depositories' 
aggregate holdings of the two companies' debt came to 3.3% of all depositories' assets, or slightly 
more than a third of their aggregate net worth (which was about 9.1% of assets), while their 
aggregate holdings of the GSEs' MBS came to 8.5% of their aggregate assets.48  Though losses of 
value of GSE debt and MBS of, say, 5% would be far from a welcome event for depositories, it 
would also be far from a devastating event for most of them and would be unlikely to have 
widespread systemic consequences. 
 As for the direct effects on mortgage markets of financial difficulties by one of the 
companies, it is difficult to imagine no consequences when a $800 billion or $1 trillion company 
withdraws from its primary activities.  But the extent of the consequences would depend on 
whether and to what extent and how quickly the other GSE could pick up the slack,49 as well as 
how elastic would be the responses of the other major providers of residential mortgage finance.50  
Since no such event has occurred, it is difficult to provide estimates of magnitudes. 
 Finally, there is general agreement that improved transparency can reduce market 
participants' misunderstandings and reduce the likelihood and extent of systemic problems.  In 
response to political pressures, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced in 2000 a set of six 
"voluntary" initiatives that would improve their public disclosures: 1) to issue subordinated debt; 2) 
to meet certain liquidity standards; 3) to enhance credit-risk disclosures; 4) to enhance interest-rate 
disclosures; 5) to obtain annual "stand-alone" credit ratings; and 6) to self-implement and report 
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their regulatory risk-based capital levels.51  These steps all seem headed in a sensible direction.52 
 
D. The absence of prepay penalties, and the bearing of interest-rate risk 
 The standard residential mortgage in the U.S. is a long-lived, fixed-rate debt instrument, 
which the borrower can prepay at any time with no penalty.53  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
both cause and effect with respect to these characteristics, since over 90% of the mortgages that 
they buy are fixed-rate instruments, and they rarely buy mortgages that have prepay penalties.  The 
absence of prepay penalties exacerbates the interest-rate risk that is borne by the holder of a 
mortgage or of MBS. 
 This last point can be seen as follows:  The holder of a non-prepayable debt instrument is 
exposed to interest-rate risk, because the value of the instrument declines when interest rates 
increase but its value increases when interest rates decline.  The longer is the maturity of the 
instrument, the greater are the price swings.  If the borrower's prepayment likelihood were a 
constant and not affected by interest rate movements -- say, prepayments were driven solely by 
household mobility, and mobility was invariant to interest rate changes -- these properties would 
apply to residential mortgages as well. 
 But prepayment behavior is affected by interest rate changes, and in ways that are adverse to 
the lender.  If mortgage interest rates decrease from the levels prevailing at the time of the mortgage 
origination, the borrower is more likely to repay and refinance her mortgage at the lower interest 
rate.54  Also, households that might not otherwise have been tempted to move to a new home may 
now find that the lower interest rates make the move (and the repayment of the original mortgage) 
worthwhile.55  This quickening of the repayment rate deprives the lender of the potential capital 
gain on the mortgage that would otherwise occur on a debt instrument that was not callable; 
equivalently, the greater pace of repayment is occurring just when the lender doesn't want 
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repayment, since the lender can then only relend (or reinvest) the funds at the lower prevailing 
interest rates. 
 When interest rates rise, prepayments will generally not occur for refinancing purposes,56 
and even the "normal" flow of mobility-driven prepayments is likely to decrease as some 
households that otherwise would have found moving to be worthwhile now find moving less 
worthwhile.57  In this case, the capital loss that the lender would have experienced on a non-callable 
debt instrument is compounded by the slackening of the prepayment rate; in essence, prepayments 
are slackening, just when the lender wishes that they would accelerate.58 
 Thus, if the borrower can prepay her mortgage with no penalty, then the pattern of 
prepayments will vary inversely with changes in interest rates and will exacerbate the interest-rate 
risk faced by lenders.  This extra risk that is borne by the lender is not free to the borrower.  Instead, 
the risk of the borrower's exercising her option to prepay without penalty is incorporated into the 
overall interest rate and fees that a competitive market will charge all borrowers (so long as the 
lender cannot determine beforehand which borrower is more likely to prepay).  Accordingly, even 
those borrowers who (for whatever reason) are unlikely to prepay their mortgages must pay extra 
because of the greater risk imposed on lenders, and there is a cross-subsidy that runs from those 
who are less likely to prepay to those who are more likely to prepay. 
 Why is the prepay option not priced more explicitly -- e.g., through an explicit penalty for 
prepaying (which, in turn, would allow a lower interest rate and lower initial fees)?  Or, at least, 
why are borrowers not offered more often59 the choice between a no-prepayment-penalty mortgage 
(with a higher interest rate and initial fees) and a prepayment penalty mortgage (with a lower 
interest rate and initial fees)?  At least part of the reason appears to be a patchwork of state 
regulation that, in some states, limits (or forbids) the ability of state-chartered depositories to 
impose prepayment penalties.  However, the buying patterns of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – they 
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almost exclusively purchase no-prepayment-penalty mortgages -- also influences the outcome. 
 Why, in turn, do the two GSEs buy almost exclusively no-prepayment-penalty mortgages?  
Partly this may be an element of standardization, since an array of different prepayment penalties 
could add to the informational burden on MBS investors to know what penalties applied to the 
MBS that they held and what the consequences for prepayments might be.  But this cannot be the 
entire story, since it would surely be possible for either company to announce that it would be 
willing to buy mortgages that had one or two prepayment penalty patterns and thereby maintain a 
reasonable level of standardization, as is true for the companies' purchases of adjustable-rate 
mortgages (which, in principle, can have a wide variety of terms).  Since the two companies 
maintain huge portfolios of these no-prepayment-penalty mortgages and MBS with their 
concomitant exacerbated interest-rate risk, which must then be managed, it may well be the case 
that they believe that they have a comparative advantage at managing this exacerbated interest-rate 
risk.  In any event, it is clear that the states' inhibitions on penalties is complementary to the GSEs' 
business strategies. 
 As a related matter, so long as the lending/borrowing arrangement with respect to a home 
involves long-term finance, interest-rate risk unavoidably arises and cannot (from an economy-wide 
perspective) be diversified away.60  Two questions then arise:  (a) Who bears the interest-rate risk? 
and (b) Who should bear that risk? 
 The first question is easier to answer:  With adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), the 
borrower bears the risk.  With long-term fixed-rate mortgages that are non-prepayable, the lender or 
the MBS holder bears most of the risk.61  As the preceding discussion indicated, the interest-rate 
risk borne by lenders on long-term fixed-rate mortgages is exacerbated by the current practice of 
allowing borrowers to prepay their mortgages without penalty.  In essence, the penalty-free prepay 
option allows the borrower to shed all interest-rate risk. 
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 The second question is harder.  Some general principles can be stated, however.  First, 
diversification of that risk is surely a good thing.  Second, the bearing of that risk should be by 
individuals/institutions that are knowledgeable and skilled at managing the risk and that are in a 
financial position to bear it without undue financial hardship (and without creating the transactions 
costs of bankruptcies, etc.).  This surely argues for allowing (but not requiring, nor forbidding) 
mortgage originators to offer ARMs to those borrowers who knowledgeably want them.  It also 
argues for allowing mortgage originators to offer fixed-rate mortgages that may (or may not) 
include prepayment penalties, which would allow the prepayment risk to be explicitly priced, and 
then letting market participants choose.  It is far from clear that the federal government needs to be 
the explicit or implicit backstop for this process through its maintenance of the special GSE status 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (or of the FHLB system).62 
 
E. Efficient transmission of benefits 
 Within the sphere of conforming mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are a protected 
duopoly, which could affect their pricing behavior and thus the extent to which they pass through to 
homebuyers the benefits that they receive as a consequence of their special GSE status.  At one 
extreme, despite their duopoly structure, they might behave like perfectly competitive firms and 
pass through 100% of the benefits to homebuyers; at the other extreme, they might collude and 
retain all of the benefits for their shareholders. 
 Dennis Carlton, David Gross, and Robert Stillman conclude that the two companies' 
activities do not raise antitrust concerns.63  Nevertheless, the issue of whether the two companies 
exercise market power remains an interesting one. 
 It does appear that the two companies have held on to at least part of their special benefits 
and have earned supra-normal returns.64  For example, for the years 1998-2002, Fannie Mae earned 
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an average return on equity (ROE) of 25.4% (and was at or above 25.0% for each of those years), 
while Freddie Mac earned an average of 24.2% for those same years; by contrast, the industry ROE 
for all FDIC-insured commercial banks for the same five years was around 14%.65  A recent 
estimate of the gross and net benefits of the GSEs' special status is consistent with these results.66  
In 2003 the two GSEs received, as a consequence of their special status, gross benefits of about 
$19.6 billion, of which they passed through about two-thirds ($13.4 billion) to homebuyers through 
lower mortgage rates and retained about one-third ($6.2 billion) for their shareholders. 
 There is, however, a deep irony to the consequences of this exercise of market power for 
allocative efficiency:  To the extent that one believes (as was argued above) that public policies in 
general encourage too much housing and that the two companies' activities make it worse, then 
their exercise of market power (implying that mortgage rates are not as low as if they behaved 
wholly competitively and thus home buying is not as encouraged) means that global allocative 
efficiency is improved. 
  
F. Possible inherent efficiencies or inefficiencies 
 Are there reasons to believe that the special GSE status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
creates a special and inherent efficiency for providing mortgage finance?  This question goes 
beyond their historical role in encouraging mortgage securitization, since asset securitization is now 
a well-established and widely employed technique in finance. 
 Skepticism is warranted as to whether the two companies’ special GSE status adds extra 
efficiency to mortgage markets.  First, as is argued above, the current broad-based approach of the 
two companies is surely not an efficient way to address the positive externality with respect to 
home ownership. 
 Second, there is the issue of transactions costs with respect to the credit-risk on residential 
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mortgages.67  In order to provide assurances of timely payments to the holders of their MBS, 
"private-label" (i.e., private, non-GSE) issuers usually create a senior-subordinated structure 
(whereby the subordinated security absorbs the first credit losses) that protects the holders of the 
senior MBS.  The creation of this structure involves transactions costs, as does the process of 
obtaining a rating on the senior MBS from one or more rating agencies (e.g., Moody's or Standard 
& Poor's).  Further, investors in the senior MBS would be interested in learning whether some of 
the subordinated MBS tranches are experiencing greater losses than was expected (which would 
mean greater risks for the associated senior MBS), thus entailing further monitoring (transactions) 
costs.  The blanket credit-loss guarantees issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (backed by the 
implicit federal guarantee) eliminates all of those costs. 
 This argument is surely correct as far as it goes.  But the Fannie/Freddie process guarantee 
must then be backstopped by the government-oriented safety-and-soundness regulatory process 
described above and ultimately by taxpayers.  Which route offers the lowest costs (short-run or 
long-run) is not obvious. 
 A third argument is that the new-era securitization process is inherently more efficient than 
is the depository-driven process of yore and that the expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(with their implicit federal guarantee) at the expense of depositories' (with their explicit federal 
deposit insurance) holdings of conforming residential mortgages is evidence of this superior 
efficiency.68  However, regulatory considerations have also played an important role in the GSEs' 
growth.  Commercial banks and S&Ls have been encouraged to hold MBS rather than whole 
mortgage loans by risk-based capital requirements (which have been in place since 1988) that 
require only 1.6% capital for holding any MBS that is rated AA or better but require 4% for holding 
unsecuritized residential mortgages.  Further, the capital requirements that have applied to Fannie 
Mae's and Freddie Mac's holdings of mortgages (2-1/2 %) have been substantially less than the 
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capital requirements that have applied to depositories' holding of mortgages (4%), giving the former 
a cost advantage.  Accordingly, though mortgage securitization (as an efficient innovation of the 
1970s and 1980s) was surely going to grow and gain market share relative to the traditional 
depository route, the extent of the GSEs’ growth is not necessarily an indicator of their special and 
inherent efficiencies. 
 As for possible inherent inefficiencies that may accompany the two companies’ special GSE 
status, there is no assurance that the current managements and organizational structures for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are the most efficient for doing what they do.  Since the Congress has issued 
only two charters of this particular kind, the ability of competitive processes to reward more 
efficient firms and winnow less efficient firms from the marketplace is inhibited.  Further, the two 
firms are not required periodically to bid for their franchises in an auction against potential 
replacements; they have been "grandfathered" indefinitely.  And the market for corporate control 
cannot operate effectively:  Their limited charters make them immune to takeover by any other 
firm, and their large size and special GSE status make them virtually immune to a "hostile" 
takeover by just an investor group. 
 As a related matter, whenever either of the two firms has expanded slightly in "horizontal" 
(e.g., sub-prime lending) or "vertical" (e.g., providing underwriting software to mortgage 
originators) direction -- or even publicly contemplated such moves -- critics have complained that 
the two companies' ability to expand arises solely from the low-cost funding that they enjoy because 
of the implicit guarantee and not because of any inherent efficiency advantage (and that they are in 
fact elbowing aside inherently more efficient enterprises).  Without a "clean" market test, there is no 
way to resolve such questions. 
 
VI. What is to be done? 
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 A. First-best 
 The analysis provided above points in a clear direction with respect to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac:  Since there seems to be no special efficiency reason for preserving their special GSE 
structure, since they mostly just add to an already excessive amount of encouragement for housing 
in the U.S., since their role in addressing the important social externality of home ownership is 
modest at best, and since the implied guarantee (to the extent that it would be honored) creates a 
contingent liability for the U.S. Government, an outright privatization of the two companies -- the 
withdrawal of their special charters and their conversion to normal corporations -- would be the 
first-best outcome.  This would imply that the two companies would no longer enjoy any special 
privileges, but also would no longer be restricted to their current narrow slice of the financial 
world.69  How these companies and their owners would fare in that scenario would then be a matter 
for markets, and not the Congress or OFHEO, to decide.70 
 As an historical matter, the presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their implied 
guarantees may well have been important for the innovation and development of mortgage 
securitization in the 1970s and 1980s.  Nevertheless, mortgage securitization is now a well-
established technology of finance that would easily survive the privatization of the two companies. 
 The consequence of true privatization for residential mortgage markets would be modest:  
Mortgage rates would be about 25 basis points higher than would otherwise be the case.  Grass 
would surely not grow in the streets of America as a consequence -- and would surely continue to 
grow in most backyards.  And, because the U.S. already builds and consumes too much housing, 
this would be a move in the right direction. 
 In their place, the federal government ought to deal directly with the true positive externality 
related to housing: encouraging low- and moderate-income first-time buyers.  Such a program 
should be an explicit on-budget encouragement for such home purchases, with subsidies for down 
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payments71 and for monthly payments. 
 As part of this true privatization, the Secretary of the Treasury should state clearly at the 
Congressional hearings that consider the legislation that the Treasury (after the passage of the 
privatization legislation) would treat the two companies just like other corporations in the U.S. 
economy, would not consider the two companies to be “too big to fail,” and would have no 
intention of “bailing them out” in the event of subsequent financial difficulties.  The President 
should reiterate this message at the official signing of the legislation.  Also, bank and S&L 
regulators should revise their "loans-to-one-borrower" regulations so that depositories' holdings of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt would be treated similarly to their holdings of other companies' 
debt (i.e., loans to any single borrower normally cannot exceed 10% of the depository's capital), 
rather than the unlimited holdings that are currently permitted.72 
 Further, in order to ameliorate the concentration of interest-rate risk that the current 
structure of fixed-rate mortgages without prepayment penalties places on lenders or MBS holders 
and that may be an extra element that unduly strengthens the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
in the mortgage markets, lenders should have the freedom to offer mortgages that would include a 
fee for the prepayment option that is usually not explicitly priced (but is surely included in the 
overall pricing of mortgages).  Such explicit pricing will also eliminate the cross-subsidy that 
currently runs from those who do not exercise the option to those who do.  State laws and 
regulations that inhibit such explicit pricing should be repealed. 
 In addition, there are at least two positive measures that could reduce the cost of housing in 
efficiency-enhancing ways.  First, and foremost, the federal government should cease placing 
impediments to international trade in construction materials; removal of the current trade 
impediments to the import of Canadian lumber would be an excellent place to start.73  Second, 
inefficient local building codes that raise the costs of housing construction more than is warranted 
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by safety or similar considerations should be modified or eliminated.  Third, states and metropolitan 
areas need to develop procedures to take into account the community-wide consequences on 
housing costs of local "large-lot" zoning measures that restrict the availability of land for lower-
cost, higher-density housing in areas where land would otherwise be inexpensive.74 
 
 B. Second-best 
 The true privatization of the two companies may well be an unlikely outcome in the current 
political environment.  The political attractiveness of an arrangement that reduces housing costs but 
has no on-budget consequences is powerful.  Accordingly, second-best measures should be 
considered. 
 First, regardless of what's done with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, an explicit 
housing program for low- and moderate-income first-time buyers is worth undertaking in its own 
right.  So are any efforts to allow explicit pricing of the prepayment option and the efficiency-
enhancing efforts to reduce the cost of housing. 
 Second, even if the two companies retain their GSE status, bank and S&L regulators could 
still apply the loans-to-one borrower limitations to depositories' holdings of their debt, as suggested 
above.75 
 Third, as a way to reduce the financial markets' belief in the "implicit guarantee," the 
Secretary of the Treasury should state loudly and at frequent intervals (e.g., Congressional hearings) 
that it is the policy of the federal government to adhere to what is stated on the Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac securities: that these are not obligations of the federal government and that the 
Treasury has no intention of "bailing them out" in the event that they become financially troubled.  
As was discussed above, such explicit denials have not been enunciated in the past. 
 Fourth, in addition to keeping or even increasing the pressures of HUD's affordable housing 
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"mission" goals with respect to the two companies' purchases of mortgages,76 the two companies 
should be forced to concentrate further on the lower end of the housing market by freezing the 
conforming loan limit at its current level of $333,700 and waiting for median sales prices (or 80% 
of median) to catch up to that level before resuming indexed annual increases.  This freeze would 
also have the beneficial effect of limiting the two companies’ growth and thereby reducing potential 
systemic risks. 
 Fifth, the safety-and-soundness regime should be strengthened through the transfer of 
OFHEO to the aegis of the Treasury, with a structure and powers (especially receivership powers) 
that resemble those of the regulatory agencies for depository institutions that are currently housed 
within the Treasury: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (for national banks) and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (for S&Ls and savings institutions).  The major argument against such 
strengthening is, as was discussed above, the risk that such strengthening would also strengthen the 
financial markets' belief in the implicit guarantee.  Though this possibility is troubling, the dangers 
of not strengthening the regulatory regime appear to be even greater.77 
 In sum, housing is too important (but also too plentiful) to be left to the tender mercies of 
the current arrangements that apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The first-best path of 
privatization is unrealistic; but some constructive second-best measures deserve serious 
consideration. 
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Table 1: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Assets and Mortgage-Backed Securities, and the 
Residential Mortgage Market (in billions of dollars; includes single- and mult-family mortgages) 
 
 
 
 
Fannie Mae 
 
Freddie Mac 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Total 
assets 
 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa 
 
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb 
 
 
 
Total 
assets 
 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa 
 
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb 
 
Total 
nonfarm, 
residential 
mortgages 
1971 $18.6 17.9 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 391
    
1975 31.6 30.8 0.0 5.9 4.9 1.6 577
    
1980 57.9  55.6  0.0 5.5 5.0 17.0  1,105
    
1985 99.1 94.1 54.6 16.6 13.5 99.9 1,730
    
1990 133.1 114.1 288.1 40.6 21.5 316.4 2,907
    
1995 316.6 252.9 513.2 137.2 107.7 459.0 3,745
    
2000 675.2 607.7 706.7 459.3 385.5 576.1 5,543
    
2001 799.9 706.8 859.0 641.1 503.8 653.1 6,110
    
2002 887.5 801.1 1,029.5 752.2 589.9 749.3 6,842
    
2003 1,009.6 901.9 1,300.2 803.4 660.4 768.9 7,715
 
a Includes repurchased mortgage-backed securities. 
b Excludes mortgage-backed securities that are held in portfolio 
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     5 See USCBO. 
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     7 In 2004 the Bush Administration announced that it would cease appointing any members to either board, as an 
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     8 And, at least through mid 2006, they have been and will be able to receive interest-free "daylight overdrafts" from 
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day but does not receive payment from them until the end of the business day.  In February 2004 the Fed announced that 
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     11 The FHLB system, which serves as a wholesale bank for many federally insured depository institutions (banks, 
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also GSEs that serve agricultural credit markets (Farm Credit System and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation, or Farmer Mac) and the student loan market (Student Loan Marketing Association, or Sallie Mae), 
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